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 Abstract 
This study investigated if financial advisors contribute to value creation in M&A transactions 
in the pharmaceutical industry, using an event study methodology. Based on 294 transactions 
worldwide between 2012-2016, an average of 3.03% positive cumulative abnormal return was 
found, significant at a 1% level. Using OLS and Heckman least square regressions, no 
significant effect of employing a financial advisor was found, no matter if the advisor was a 
top-tier or non-top-tier financial advisor. 
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1. Introduction 
During the recent decades mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has been a growing field. 
According to the Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances, M&A activity has seen a 
massively growing trend during the last 30 years, with the greatest booms around the turn of 
the millennium, and 2007, when about 40 000 transactions took place worldwide to a value of 
approximately $5000 billions USD. After the severe financial crisis there was a drop in M&A 
activity. However, during the last years, especially from 2015, there has been a growing trend 
once again (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances, 2016).  
 
Lubatkin, (1983), argues that the main motive of an acquisition should be to strengthen the 
performance of the firm. The idea that value creation should be the central goal for M&As 
springs from the theory that the purpose of the company should be to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth (Roe, 2001). However, it is not clear that M&A actually is a value creating activity 
when it comes to shareholder value. Scholars have stated that M&A does not create any value 
for shareholders, for example Agrawal and Jaffe (2000). 
 
In M&A transactions there is often not solely the acquiring firm that value the company. In 
many cases, an investment bank will be responsible for a large part of it. This comes with 
both advantages and risks. Jacob, Rock and Weber (2008) and McLaughlin (1992) writes 
about the multiple incentives that investment banks might have in financial advisory, and 
approaches it as an agency problem. Advisory fees in M&As is a big part of an investment 
bank's income (Bowers and Miller, 1990). Banks have during the last decades also started to 
approach firms with possible prospects (Bowers and Miller, 1990), showing that the M&A 
activity is of high interest for the banks. An executed transaction will bring a success fee to 
the advisor and will also affect the bank’s position in the league table of financial advisors 
positively. A league table within investment banking is a ranking that summarize the number 
and value of transactions that the investment banks have executed under a specific period, and 
is considered to highly affect the competitiveness of the bank (Walter, Yawson and Yeung 
,2008). 
 
During a valuation of a company, it often exists an issue of reduced information for the 
acquirer. This discrepancy between buyer and seller is acknowledged as an information 
asymmetry, first described by Akerlof (1970). As an industry involves more elements / higher 
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proportions of activities that are difficult to value, the possibility to make a correct valuation 
based on public information decreases and thereby the asymmetric information will increase 
(Servaes and Zenner, 1996).  
 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) write that, as the pharmaceutical industry involves a high 
proportion of research and development (R&D), it is to be considered as an industry with high 
asymmetric information. The target will almost always be in a more favourable position in 
evaluating the potential capitalization of a drug in development. This makes the already 
difficult valuation in the M&A industry even more difficult when involving a target in an 
industry such as the pharmaceutical.  
 
The wave of M&As in general have inspired scholars such as Moeller et al. (2007) to further 
research. They found that the average premium for an US public acquisition between 1980 
and 2001 was between 62% - 68%, which is argued to require massive cost savings and 
growth targets to be justified. Giliberto and Varaya (1989), discuss the winner’s curse 
hypothesis, where the winner of a bid auction overpays the true value of the company, an 
issue of adverse selection and asymmetric information, according to Hong and Shum (2002). 
Nevertheless, as high premiums and winner’s curse seem to be affected by high asymmetric 
information, several studies have tried to examine possibilities to reduce asymmetric 
information in mergers and acquisitions. Moeller et al. (2007), showed that the wealth of the 
acquirer shareholders and asymmetric information are related. 
 
Besides the asymmetric information regarding the company in a merger or acquisition, 
Williamson (1975) also mentions the difficulties of acquiring firms outside of the acquirer's 
core competencies. Servaes and Zenner (1996) offers a hypothesis about the asymmetric 
information, where they hypothesize that an information asymmetry can be due to things as 
industry relatedness and type of transaction. Servaes and Zenner also add that it seems like if 
the information asymmetry increases, the need of a financial advisor increases as well.  
 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) found it reasonable that firms with high asymmetric 
information find targets with similar competencies. Experience of sales in the industry of 
interest seems to affect acquirer returns positive, as can be seen in the same study by Higgins 
and Rodriguez (2006), which strengthen the hypothesis that it is not only knowledge about the 
company itself that can manage asymmetric information, but also industry specialized 
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knowledge. This could be supported by studies that show that industry specialized financial 
firms and advisors tend to create significantly higher acquirer returns compared to non-
specialized (Cressy, Munari and Malipiero, 2007).  
 
Walter et al. (2008) show that investment banks that are specialized outperform those who are 
not, in creating abnormal return to shareholders, when stock are included as payment in the 
deal. This could be argued by that investment banks that perform many transactions in an 
industry evolve strategies on how to manage and reduce asymmetric information and thereby 
produce a higher acquirer return. On the other hand, as the positive effect seems to be affected 
by both choices of payment and reputation it is still difficult to evaluate the true effect of 
industrial specialization in investment banks to reduce asymmetric information (Walter et al., 
2008). 
 
However, in a study by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), it is found that M&As 
advised by investment banks that are considered as top-tier deliver a higher acquirer return 
than if advised by a non-top-tier bank in public transactions. Bao and Edmans (2011) describe 
a skilled-advice hypothesis, where banks can help to identify synergistic targets and 
favourable terms, suggesting that highest quality advisors would lead to highest return. They 
also present results that support this hypothesis, where the average top financial advisor is 
related to a positive acquirer return, an effect that is increasing as the investment bank 
increase the number of deals they advice.  
 
If this is true we would believe that financial advisory do matters for the outcome of 
shareholder wealth and that the highest-quality bank would provide the best outcome (Bao 
and Edmans, 2011). But when it comes to this point it appears to exist different opinions. An 
article published in Wall Street Journal in May 2016, stated that during the first 4 months of 
2016, 27% of the total mergers and acquisitions in the US were executed without any 
financial advisor, an increasing trend that could be seen during the latest years (Mattioli 
,2016, 10 May).  
 
Previous studies have also questioned the effect of financial advisory in M&A, where 
different multiples have been chosen to express advisory quality. Bowers and Miller (1990) 
uses prestige of the financial advisor’s name and found no link with the return of the acquirer. 
Rau (2000) used market share and found a negative relationship between advisory quality and 
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return of acquirer and Servaes and Zenner (1996) found that it is not beneficial to hire a 
financial advisor in comparison to perform the deal in-house. This would imply that the 
passive execution hypothesis stated by Bao and Edmans (2011) is more plausible. This 
hypothesis states that banks do not provide good advices and just undertake the deal as 
instructed by the client. 
 
Today there is no clear picture of how investment banks contribute to acquirer return in M&A 
transactions, even less in the pharmaceutical industry. Studies have partly showed that the 
hypothesis about financial advisors positively affecting shareholder wealth and reducing 
asymmetric information could be plausible. However, these studies are done over several 
sectors that might also include sectors with low asymmetric information. In order to 
investigate the use of financial advisors to reduce asymmetric information, deepened studies 
in sectors with high asymmetric information would be suitable. As the pharmaceutical 
industry is highly affected by this phenomenon, it is of high interest to investigate the 
hypothesis furthermore in this industry.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether acquisitions create shareholder value or not, 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, it will also investigate if the choice of financial 
advisors, at the buyer side, in acquisitions affect acquirer abnormal returns positively 
compared to an acquisition without a financial advisor. Also, we will examine if the choice of 
a top-tier financial advisor matter on acquirer abnormal returns. 
 
2. Theory and hypothesis 
The definition of an information asymmetry was first described by Akerlof (1970), where the 
seller possesses more information about the asset than the buyer. This will lead to an 
asymmetry in the relation between buyer and seller and put the buyer in a place where the 
seller always knows better if the bidding price is above or below the true value. This will 
create an adverse selection, where only those with a lower true value than the bid is willing to 
sell. As the buyer knows about this asymmetric information they will lower the bid. This 
process will continue until the market collapse. Myers and Majluf (1984) propose that 
asymmetric information and adverse selection that can be implemented in sectors with high 
technology and R&D, when the asset includes several areas of asymmetric information.   
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Even though asymmetric information exists in almost every transaction, mergers and 
acquisitions have increased in popularity the latest decades. During this time, several studies 
have focused on how to manage this information asymmetry. Still today, there is no 
consensus whether M&A create shareholder value in the short or long run. Hence, merger and 
acquisitions is based on the idea that it will create additional value (Bowers and Miller, 1990), 
based on the assumption that the company could be properly valued. It is therefore plausible 
to believe that M&A is one way to create value. 
 
H1: M&A creates value to shareholders in pharmaceutical companies 
 
In order for acquirers to reduce the information asymmetry in mergers and acquisitions, 
researchers have studied, for instance, the importance of financial advisors. The hypothesis 
regarding asymmetric information stated by Servaes and Zenner (1996), shows that firms tend 
to seek financial advisors to manage the information asymmetry in order to create acquirer 
return. Even though financial advisors charge fees, as long as they contribute to an abnormal 
return in shareholder wealth that surpasses the advisory-fee, they will be beneficial. This 
means that in order to be beneficial, financial advisors need to create abnormal returns to 
shareholder wealth, leading to our second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Financial advisory within M&A creates additional shareholder wealth in pharmaceutical 
companies 
 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) propose that sales and research experiences are important in 
order to create abnormal return for the acquirer. Golubov et al. (2012) show that this type of 
industrial knowledge tends to be true in the financial advisory industry as well. Results 
suggests that as financial advisor’s advice more and larger deals the acquirer return tends to 
increase. With the background of the asymmetric information hypothesis by Servaes and 
Zenner (1996) and studies made on industrial specialization in other industries (Cressy et al. 
,2007), we hypothesize that the industrial specialization of the advising firm is important for 
acquirer return.   
 
H3: Industry specialization in financial advisory within M&A creates additional shareholder 
wealth in pharmaceutical companies 
 
 9 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample collection 
Since we wanted to investigate if hiring a financial advisor would make the acquirer return 
higher, we chose to apply an event study approach where we calculated abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as described and used by Mackinlay (1997). The study 
is a quantitative comparative analysis since we compared M&As where the acquirer 
employed an investment bank and where they did not. The study focused only on the 
abnormal returns of the acquiring firm, and not of the targeted firm. 
 
We collected data of M&A deals from 2012 to 2016 from the Zephyr database, offered by 
Bureau van Dijk, which contains information from over 500 000 M&A deals. The study was 
solely performed on acquisitions that was completed and where the acquirer and the target 
was included in SIC-code category 283 (Drugs). Firm specific data on stocks and financial 
values for our control variables was based on data from Zephyr. Data on stock prices and 
other stock information has been collected from the Bloomberg terminal. When further 
writing M&A in this paper, the authors are focusing on the acquisition part of this 
phenomena. 
 
League tables was created on our collected sample from Zephyr. One league table was created 
for every year respectively, from 2011-2015 to create the dummy variable, see Appendix A. 
Every table displayed the top 10 financial advisors in total deal value for the respective year. 
We chose to create a new league table for each year in order to find the currently most active 
banks. A financial advisor was considered to be top-tier if it was placed in a top eight position 
in the League table from the year prior to the deal, otherwise it was considered as non-top tier. 
 
3.2 Sample constraints 
After creating the League tables, we applied some constraints on our sample. Firstly, the 
acquiring firm had to be listed and have data on trading days for 292 days prior to the 
announcement of the deal. This to be able to catch 250 daily observations and exclude a 42-
days prior to announcement date due to the possibility of information leakage (Schwert 
,1996).  
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We also excluded all the deals where Zephyr did not report any deal value. Deals where the 
acquirer had any ownership in the target prior to the deal and all deals where the target was an 
entity of a company was excluded. We also excluded all deals where the acquirer did not 
acquire 100 % of the target. Therefore, only acquisitions where 100% of the company was 
bought in one transaction, according to data from Zephyr, were included in our sample. Also, 
as the pharmaceutical industry include several large companies, many transactions might not 
affect the share price as the size of the deal may be too small. Therefore, we chose to exclude 
all deals where the transaction value was below one percent of the market capitalization of the 
acquiring firm. Lastly we also, in line with McGahan (1999), excluded all deals where either 
the acquirer or the target had a SIC code that started with 6 (Financial institutions and 
Insurance companies). 
 
3.3 Abnormal Returns 
Abnormal returns are a common measure for value creation and has been used in many 
preceding studies, Seth (1990), Mackinlay (1997) and Golubov et al. (2012). The definition of 
abnormal returns is: 
ARit = Rit - (i+iRmt) 
 
In this formula ARit is the abnormal shareholder return for stock i at time t. Rit is the rate of 
return for stock i at time t. To calculate  and , we use the market model as stated by 
Mackinlay (1997), which relates the return of the security to the market return and follows 
from the assumed joint normality of asset returns. For any security the model is stated as:  
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
We used the MSCI world index as an index for the market portfolio since about 50% of the 
deals in our sample were conducted globally. According to Roll (1992) there is a question 
about how far back in time you should go to get a large sample. This is important for 
statistical accuracy, when estimating the parameters i and i, since there could be a shift in 
the parameters of the return generating mechanism when you travel back in time. We chose to 
use a 250-day period for ordinary least squares of daily returns to estimate i and i. We also 
excluded 42 days prior to the event date so we could be sure that our estimated parameters 
would not be affected by information leakage, this is all in line with Schwert’s (1996) 
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findings. The estimation window was therefore (-292, -42). CARs was then calculated for 
different time periods around the announcement day. We only calculated CARs for the 
acquiring firm since this study did not take the CAR of the target in consideration. CARs is 
calculated as: 
 
CARi(1, 2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
 
 
This CAR value was used to determine hypothesis one, if M&A in the pharmaceutical 
industry creates value to shareholders. The significance of our results was tested with a two-
sided student's t-test. 
 
3.4 Independent variables 
Since the main purpose of this study was to investigate if employing a financial advisor had 
any effect on the shareholder value of the firm we did an OLS-regression, where we used 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. As main independent variable was a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 for deals where the acquirer had a financial advisor, 
according to Zephyr, and 0 for deals where the acquirer didn’t have a financial advisor used. 
 
We were also interested in if employing a top-tier bank had any effect on the shareholder 
wealth. Therefore, we made another OLS-regression, with heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors, on the subsample with the deals where the acquirer employed a financial advisor. Here 
we used a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for deals where the acquirer employed a 
top-tier bank or 0 for deals where the acquirer employed a non-top tier bank. 
 
We chose to include the same control variables since both Servaes and Zenner (1996), who 
tested for the effect of employing a financial advisor, and Golubov et al. (2012), who tested 
for the effect of employing a top-tier bank, used almost the same type of control variables in 
their respective analysis. The chosen variables are presented below in Table I. 
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Table I 
Variable definitions 
The table below presents chosen control variables to be included in the regressions. Ln denotes the natural 
logarithm. The variable Previous acquisitions equals acquisitions reported as completed before day of 
announcement. 
Variable Definition 
Ln(Deal value) Logarithmic value of the transaction from Zephyr in US $ 
million 
Ln(Size) Logarithmic acquirer market value of equity the year prior to the 
acquisition announcement based on data from Zephyr in US $ 
million 
Relative size Value of the transaction from Zephyr divided by the acquirer’s 
market value of equity the year prior to the announcement based 
on data from Zephyr 
Payment method Dummy variable: 1 for deals in which consideration includes 
stock, 0 if not 
Domestic Dummy variable: 1 for deals where the acquirer and target is 
based in the same country according to Zephyr, 0 if not 
Previous acquisitions Number of acquisitions made by the acquirer over the last 10 
years prior the acquisition according to Zephyr 
 
It is important to have in mind that these analyses were made on the assumption that both the 
choice to employ an advisor and the choice of which advisor to employ is determined 
exogenously. But as Golubov et al. (2012) show, there are significant differences in the 
characteristics of both acquirer- and deal-specifics for the two categories of advisors, Top-tier 
and non top-tier, and this would suggest that which advisor to employ could be determined 
endogenously. This means that self-selection bias could be a fact which would cause the OLS 
estimates to be unreliable, as shown by Heckman (1979). Based on the same assumptions, we 
could have a problem with endogeneity with the choice of employing an advisor or not. 
 
Heckman means that self-selection bias is similar to omitted variable bias and proposes to use 
a two-step procedure to control for it. Therefore, we implemented a procedure where we, for 
the case with the choice of employing a financial advisor or not, had a first-stage equation 
which modelled the choice of employing a financial advisor or not and a second-stage 
equation that controlled for the selection bias. For the case with the choice of employing a 
top-tier or a non top-tier advisor we have followed the same procedure, with a first-stage 
equation that modelled for the choice and a second-stage equation that controlled for the bias.  
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This variable should also have an influence on the choice but not on the outcome (Golubov et 
al., 2012). The first stage equation has been estimated with a probit regression. The second 
stage equation will have the CAR as dependent variable and an inverse Mills ratio that adjusts 
for the non-zero mean of error terms. This inverse Mills ratio have been used to determine if 
the main independent variable had any significant effect on the acquirer-CAR, this is in line 
with how Golubov et al. (2012) performs their study. 
 
Following Golubov et al. (2012), we created a variable called scope to use as an instrument 
variable in the second-stage equation. This was a variable which in the case for the choice of 
either employing or not employing a financial advisor was represented by the extent to which 
the acquirer had employed a financial advisor in prior deals. It is a dummy variable which 
take the value of 1 if the acquirer has employed a financial advisor in any M&A deal 5 year 
prior to the deal according to data from Zephyr and the value of 0 otherwise. In the case for 
the choice between employing a top-tier advisor or a non-top tier advisor the variable 
represented to which extent the acquirer has employed a top-tier financial advisor in prior 
deals. It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer has employed a top-tier 
financial advisor in any M&A deal 5 year prior to the deal according to data from Zephyr and 
the value of 0 otherwise. The instrument was created from league tables from 2007-2015, see 
Appendix B. 
 
3.5 Event windows 
Hackbart and Morellec (2008) states that when it comes to value creation the most reliable 
measures will be drawn from short-term event windows. We therefore mainly analysed our 
results on a three-day period around the announcement day (-1,1). In other words, from one 
day prior to one day post the announcement day. In the case of a weekend announcement, the 
first trading day post that weekend is used as announcement date. The assumption behind this 
is that if M&A is seen as a value creating activity an announcement of a M&A deal would be 
a sign of potential value creation.  
 
We have also applied some other event windows to capture patterns in the timeframe and to 
check for robustness in our results. We calculated one additional short- term window, (-3, 3), 
and because of Schwert’s (1996) findings about the 42-day price run-up period we also 
calculated (-42, -1). 
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3.6 Model 
Following Golubov et al. (2012), the models were developed in order to measure the effect of 
financial advisory on CAR in acquisitions. Two models were used, one to measure the CAR 
in the total sample, sub grouped in using financial advisor or not, (1). The second model 
measured CAR in the advisor subgroup, grouped in using top-tier financial advisor or not, (2). 
The models used Advisor and Top-advisor as variable of interest, respectively. Both models 
included the same independent variables as mentioned earlier as controls. 
 
 
1) 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼𝑎 + 𝛽𝑥𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽𝑎…𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑎 
 
2) 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽𝑔…𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑏 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive characteristics 
As seen in table II, a total of 294 deals were included in the sample after implementation of 
restrictions. To be noticed is the differences between mean and median in all controls 
concerning size. This suggests a high number of smaller deals and a few larger. The average 
deal value and size of the acquirer have an average about ten times the median, suggesting a 
sample skewness, with a few transactions affecting the average value. The data also suggests 
that the average deal size is about 50% of acquirer market capitalization. Furthermore, the 
data show that every fourth deal included stocks and that every other deal was performed 
domestic. An average of about six prior deals could be noticed, with a range between zero and 
51 deals.  
 
Table II 
Sample characteristics 
This table shows the relevant sample characteristics for all 294 deal in our sample. The variable size is defined as 
the market cap of the acquirer one year before the year of announcement. The variables payment method and 
domestic are dummy variables and taking a value between 0 and 1.  
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Min Max 
Deal value ($ mln) 1 240 109 14.8 525 0.098 32 000 
Size ($ mln) 10 900 932 112 4 200 0.22 184 000 
Relative size 0.53 0.11 0.04 0.33 0.01 24.55 
Payment method 0.25 - - - - - 
Domestic 0.53 - - - - - 
Previous acquisitions 6.41 3 1 9 0 51 
 
 
Table III presents the number of deals in the given sample. It also presents the cumulative 
average abnormal return, (CAAR), in the sample for the main time window (-1, 1), as well as 
in the subgroups Advisor and Non-advisor. The subgroups represent deals advised or not 
advised by an investment bank. To begin with, the overall CAAR in the sample show a 
significantly positive abnormal return on executing an acquisition (3.03%). Furthermore, 
differences in the subgroups could be noticed. Where deals advised by investment banks 
showed a positive, yet not significant abnormal return, while deals done in-house were 
significant and positive. However, no significant difference in means could be noticed. 
 
In the total sample, 56.46% had a CAR above 0 during a three-day period around the 
announcement of the deal, while the advisor subgroup is slightly lower and non-advisor 
slightly higher. 
 16 
Table III 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
The table presents data regarding CAAR within the total sample and in selected sub-groups during the main time 
window (-1, 1). Number of observations, standard deviations, t-statistics and % of CAR above zero is also 
shown in the table. In the bottom line the differences in means between the sub-groups is stated. The symbols *, 
** and *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Obs. CAAR Std. Dev. t-stat % CAR>0 
Total  294 3.03%*** 13.80% 3.7656 56.46% 
Advisor 134 1.91%* 12.49% 1.7733 50.75% 
Non-advisor 160 3.97%*** 14.78% 3.3942 61.25% 
Differences in mean     2.05%  1.2713  
 
As seen in table IV, the distribution of CAR in our sample is widely spread from below -15% 
to above +15% during our time window. The distribution is to be considered as normal, with 
a slight skew towards positive returns.  
 
Table IV 
This table presents the distribution of CAR in acquisitions made in the pharmaceutical industry during 2012 – 
2016. The CAR is presented in the total number of deals in each category and by percentage of all deals included 
in each category. 
Magnitude 
Number of observed 
abnormal return 
Number of observed 
abnormal return in % 
               CAR < -15% 7 2.38% 
  -15% < CAR < -10% 12 4.08% 
-10% < CAR < -5% 22 7.48% 
 -5% < CAR < 0% 88 29.93% 
  0% < CAR < 5% 92 31.29% 
    5% < CAR < 10% 28 9.52% 
  10% < CAR < 15% 20 6.80% 
              CAR > 15% 25 8.50% 
 
 
4.2 Pairwise correlations 
In table IV, pairwise correlations between the main dependent variable (CAR (-1,1)), the two 
different main independent variables (Advisor, Top-Advisor) and our other independent 
control variables, for both the total sample and the advisor sub-sample, are shown. In both 
samples no correlation between the dependent and the main independent variable is found. In 
the total sample we found some significant correlations. CAR is positively correlated to 
payment method (0.1586). Advisor is positively correlated to deal value (0.2640) and size 
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(0.1826), suggesting that in large deals and in deals where the acquirer has a large market 
capitalization, the acquirer is more likely to use an advisor.  
 
When looking at the advisor sub-sample we also found that CAR is positively correlated to 
relative size (0.2856), which could imply that in a deal where the deal value is high relative to 
the acquirer’s market capitalization, the acquirer is more likely to achieve a high abnormal 
return. We also found that top advisor, in the same way as advisor, is positively correlated to 
deal value and size, but also to previous acquisitions (0.3523), proposing that an acquirer that 
has made many prior acquisitions is more likely to employ a top advisor. Top advisor is also 
negatively related to payment method (-0.1849), which would imply that in deals where the 
payment includes stock the acquirer is less likely to employ a top advisor. However, no high 
correlation could be found in the total sample or sub-sample between our variables of interest 
and control variables. 
 
Significant correlations could be observed between the control variables. Deal value and size 
is positively correlated to previous acquisitions. This could be interpreted as that in large 
deals and deals where the acquirer has a large market cap the acquirer is more likely to have 
taken part in many other acquisition prior to this acquisition. Payment method is negatively 
correlated to size (-0.1148) and previous acquisitions (-0.2286). A negative correlation could 
suggest that if it is a deal where the acquirer has a large market capitalization or has 
participated in many previous acquisitions, the payment is less likely to include stock. 
Payment method is also positively correlated to relative size (0.1737) and domestic (0.1411). 
Yet significant correlations could be observed between the control variables, the number of 
high correlated variables are low.  
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Table V 
In this table pairwise correlations between the dependent variable (CAR), the two different main independent 
variables (Advisor, Top advisor) and our six different independent control variables is provided. The symbols *, 
** and *** denotes statistical significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
4.3 Regressions analysis 
In table VI, the main event window, CAR (-1,1) for the total sample, have been regressed on 
Advisor and the six control variables. CAR (-1,1) for the advisor sub-sample have also been 
regressed on Top Advisor and the six control variables. In model 1, (M1), the CAR for the 
total sample have been regressed on Advisor and all the control variables. As in table V, no 
significant relationship is found between CAR and Advisor. The R
2
 for the model is 0.0574.  
 
In model 2, (M2,) the CAR for the advisor sub-sample have been regressed on Top Advisor 
and all the control variables. As in table V, no significant relationship is found between CAR 
A. Total Sample        
 
CAR Advisor Deal value Size 
Relative 
size 
Payment 
method 
Domestic 
1. CAR (-1, 1) 
       
2. Advisor -0.0742 
      
3. Deal value -0.0043 0.2640*** 
     
4. Size -0.0658 0.1826*** 0.4909*** 
    
5. Relative size -0.0988* 0.0665 0.0695 -0.0792 
   
6. Payment             
method 
0.1586*** 0.0672 0.0686 -0.1148*** 0.1737** 
  
7. Domestic 0.0539 -0.0499 -0.0681 -0.0154 -0.0077 0.1411** 
 
8. Previous 
acquisitions 
-0.0881 0.0428 0.3179*** 0.3523*** 0.0212 -0.2286*** -0.1366** 
B. Advisor sub-sample       
 
CAR Advisor Deal value Size 
Relative 
size 
Payment 
method 
Domestic 
1. CAR (-1, 1) 
       
2. Top advisor 0.0368 
      
3. Deal value -0.0445 0.4429*** 
     
4. Size -0.0611 0.3525*** 0.4909*** 
    
5. Relative size 0.2856*** -0.0513 0.0695 -0.0792 
   
6. Payment 
method 
0.2284*** -0.1849** 0.0686 -0.1148** 0.1737** 
  
7. Domestic 0.0413 -0.0469 -0.0681 -0.0154 -0.0077 0.1411** 
 
8. Previous 
acquisitions 
-0.0201 0.3523*** 0.3179*** 0.3523*** 0.0212 -0.2286*** -0.1366** 
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and Top Advisor. The R
2
 for the model is 0.1414 in (M2). In the same model we have a 
significant positive relationship, on a 5 % level, between CAR and Payment Method, which 
suggests that a deal where the acquirer employs an advisor and the payment includes stock 
will have a positive reaction in abnormal return over a 3-day period around the announcement 
date, compared to deals without. We can also observe a significant positive relationship at the 
5% level between CAR and Relative size, suggesting that as the deals increases in fraction of 
the acquirer market capitalization the deal tend to generate a higher CAR during the observed 
time window. 
Table VI 
 OLS regression analysis on Bidder CAR 
The table presents results of a OLS regression of acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry worldwide during 
2012 – 2016 and of acquisitions using a financial advisor during the same time period over a three-day period  
 (-1, 1). The symbols *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N 
denotes number of observations. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis. 
 
As earlier discussed, there are reasons to believe that the choice of advisor is not exogenously 
decided, why a Heckman two stage least squares was conducted. The two instrument 
variables, prior acquisitions involving an investment bank and prior acquisitions involving a 
top-tier investment bank, were created and showed a statistically significant correlation 
(0.2911 and 0.3725, respectively). These two variables are called scope in the regression, as 
 A. Total sample B. Advisor sub-sample 
 (M1)  (M2) 
Intercept 0.1036  
(1.02) 
 -0.0065  
(-0.05) 
Advisor -0.0053 
 (-0.35) 
  
Top-advisor   0.0303  
(1.34) 
Ln(Deal value) -0.1550  
(-1.35) 
 -0.0138  
(-1.51) 
Ln(Size) 0.0098  
(1.18) 
 0.0117  
(1.22) 
Relative size 0.0099  
(1.02) 
 0.0220**  
(2.55) 
Payment method 0.0458*  
(1.79) 
 0.0625**  
(2.18) 
Domestic -0.0007  
(-0.05) 
 0.0058  
(0.29) 
Previous acquisitions -0.0003  
(-0.31) 
 0.0001  
(0.12) 
    
N 294  134 
R
2
 0.0574  0.1414 
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earlier mention and similar instrument variables have been used by Golubov et al. (2012). A 
weak instrument test was performed, rejecting the null-hypothesis that neither instrument 
would be weak. In model 3 (M3), seen in table VII, the first stage regression shows that our 
instrument is highly significant as an instrument in the regression. The choice of using an 
advisor is also highly positively related to deal size and negatively to acquirer size and 
number of previous acquisitions. The pseudo-R
2
 for the model was 0.2284. The z-value of the 
inverse Mills ratio was 0.13, suggesting that no self-selection is observed in the model, 
proposing (M1) to be reliable. Model 5 (M5) show that choosing a top-advisor is related to 
the deal value at 1% significance level. No significant relatedness with the instrument could 
be observed. With a pseudo-R
2
 at 0.3205, the model explains about 30% why firms choose a 
top-advisor. The z-value of the inverse Mills ratio was 0.14, again suggesting that no self-
selection is observed in the model, proposing (M2) to be reliable.  
 
Table VII 
Heckman two-stage procedure regression analysis on Bidder CAR 
The table presents result of a Heckman two-stage procedure of acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry 
worldwide during 2012 – 2016 and of acquisitions using a financial advisor during the same time period over a 
three-day period (-1, 1). Scope is the instrument used in the regression and represents the variable of interest. 
The symbols *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N denotes 
number of observations. T-statistics are presented in the parenthesis. 
 A. Total sample  B. Advisor sub-sample 
 (M3) 
Selection 
(M4) 
Outcome 
 (M5) 
Selection 
(M6) 
Outcome 
Intercept -4.1942*** 
(-5.14) 
-0.0775 
(-0.41) 
 -8.5787*** 
(-4.50) 
0.1545 
(0.17) 
Scope 0.7243*** 
(3.75) 
  0.2631 
(0.81) 
 
Ln(Deal value) 0.5016*** 
(6.60) 
-0.0092 
(-0.53) 
 0.3720*** 
(2.70) 
0.0035 
(0.10) 
Ln(Size) -0.2628*** 
(-3.78) 
0.0111 
(0.96) 
 0.0287 
(0.22) 
-0.0102 
(-0.72) 
Relative size -0.0917** 
(-1.98) 
0.0213*** 
(3.06) 
 -0.0622 
(-0.39) 
0.0201 
(1.07) 
Payment method 0.3212 
(1.55) 
0.0606** 
(2.53) 
 -0.4397 
(-1.25) 
0.0615 
(1.01) 
Domestic 0.2499 
(1.45) 
0.0077 
(0.37) 
 0.2277 
(0.82) 
-0.0379 
(-1.15) 
Previous acquisitions -0.0310*** 
(-2.62) 
0.0002 
(0.13) 
 0.0113 
(0.57) 
0.0012 
(0.74) 
      
N 294 294  134 134 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2284   0.3205  
Inverse Mills ratio  0.0071 
(0.13) 
  0.0184 
(0.14) 
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4.4 Robustness analysis 
As we earlier mentioned, additional time windows have been used to do a robustness analysis 
and check for pattern over time. Table VIII shows CAARs for the two additional time 
windows. In the additional short-time window (-3,3) we see the same pattern as in the main 
time window. We have a significant positive CAAR-value, on 1 % level, for both the total 
sample and a significant positive CAAR-value, on 10 % level, for the advisor sample. For the 
non-advisor sample, we still have significant positive CAAR-value, but now only significant 
on a 10 % level. For the run-up period (-42,-1), defined by Schwert (1996), we still have 
positive values on the CAARs for all the samples, all though now statistically insignificant. 
 
Table VIII 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
The table presents data regarding CAR within the total sample and in selected sub-groups during the time 
windows (-3, 3) and (-42, -1). Number of observations, standard deviations, t-statistics and % of CAR above 
zero is also shown in the table.  The symbols *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
  
  Obs. CAAR Std. Dev. t-stat % CAR>0 
       
 
Total 293 2.18%** 15.37% 2.43 55.29% 
(-3, 3) Advisor 133 2.00%* 12.15% 1.90 53.38% 
 
Non-advisor 160 2.36%* 17.65% 1.67 56.88% 
 Differences in mean  0.36%  0.19  
       
 
Total 291 1.35% 26.65% 0.86 49.48% 
(-42, -1) Advisor 131 1.27% 15.90% 0.93 49.62% 
  Non-advisor 160 1.41% 32.98% 0.54 49.38% 
 Differences in mean  0.17%  0.04  
       
 
Table IX shows OLS-regressions on all independent variables for the two additional time 
windows. As for the main time window (-1,1), shown in table V, we find no significant 
relationship between CAR and Advisor/Top Advisor, in either of the two samples, for the two 
additional time windows. This is an indication that the model is robust to additional time 
windows. 
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Table IX 
 OLS regression analysis on Bidder CAR 
The table presents results of a OLS regression of acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry worldwide during 
2012 – 2016 and of acquisitions using a financial advisor during the time window (-3, 3) and (-42, -1). The 
symbols *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N denotes 
number of observations. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis 
 
In Table X, Heckman two-stage regressions is shown for the two additional time-windows. 
As for the main time window (-1,1), shown in table VII, looking at the inverse Mills ratio, no 
significant relationship between CAR and the two different Scope-variables is found, in 
neither of the additional time windows. This indicates that the model is robust to additional 
time windows. 
 
  A. Total sample   B. Advisor sub-sample 
  (-3, 3) (-42, -1)   (-3, 3) (-42, -1) 
Intercept 
0.0867 
(0.78) 
 
0.1476 
(0.99) 
 
 
0.0849 
(0.76) 
 
0.0845 
(0.55) 
 
Advisor 
0.0114 
(0.77) 
 
0.0166 
(0.66) 
 
   
Top-advisor 
 
   
0.0095 
(0.42) 
 
0.0255 
(0.92) 
 
Ln(Deal value) 
-0.0077 
(-1.03) 
 
-0.0132 
(-0.80) 
 
 
-0.0071 
(-0.96) 
 
0.0011 
(0.12) 
 
Ln(Size) 
0.0039 
(0.51) 
 
0.0040 
(0.35) 
 
 
0.0025 
(0.30) 
 
-0.0060 
(-0.64) 
 
Relative size 
0.0062 
(0.67) 
 
0.0027 
(0.69) 
 
 
0.0155 
(1.38) 
 
-0.0025 
(-0.45) 
 
Payment method 
0.0262 
(1.00) 
 
0.0475 
(1.05) 
 
 
0.0599** 
(2.08) 
 
0.0661* 
(1.75) 
 
Domestic 
-0.0230 
(-1.51) 
 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.0007 
(-0.03) 
 
0.0257 
(1.14) 
 
Previous acquisitions 
-0,0008 
(-0.69) 
0.0008 
(0.52)  
-0.0007 
(-0.60) 
-0.0005 
(-0.41) 
      
N 293 291 
 
133 131 
R
2
 0.0237 0.0129 
 
0.1421 0.0684 
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the findings of Higgins and Rodriquez (2006), that found positive CAR in acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, the findings of scholars such as Agrawal and 
Jaffe (2000), where no positive CAR could be observed, are contradicted. One should notice 
that the previous mentioned study with negative CAR was performed on the overall M&A 
market, while Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), just as this study, was conducted in the 
pharmaceutical industry. This results could suggest that the efficiency of acquisitions 
differentiates between sectors. One could hypothesize that acquisitions is profitable in the 
pharmaceutical industry based on the findings of Higgins and Rodriquez (2006) and the data 
presented in this study. Based on the hypothesis that M&A actually creates value in the 
pharmaceutical industry, the existence of the phenomena “Big pharma” could be seen as ever 
more logical. 
 
It is today still no clear picture of whether M&A transactions create value for the acquirer 
shareholders. This study supports further investigations whether or not it exists differences in 
profitability between industries in these type of transactions. Furthermore, one should keep in 
mind that this study was conducted on acquisitions during a five-year period. In order to 
increase the reliability of the overall performance of M&A transactions, it is suggested to 
increase the period of transaction record even more. Also, a cyclicality in number of mergers 
and acquisitions during a business cycle, could be another reason for further research with a 
wider time window. 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is an industry with decades of increasing numbers of Mergers 
and Acquisitions. Based on our results, one would argue that this increasing number of 
acquisitions on average are rational and in the interest of the shareholders and fulfil the profit 
maximization purpose, as stated by Roe (2001). However, the actual motive of the 
acquisitions was not studied in this paper, but is a relevant topic for further research. 
 
One should also keep in mind that we have chosen to focus on time windows closely related 
to the date of announcement and thereby only focusing on the short term bidder return. 
However, scholars have presented doubts regarding the long term profit in M&As. As an 
example, Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that deals paid with stocks had a negative excess 
return during a five-year period. Also, as the development time in the pharmaceutical industry 
is fairly long, it would be of interest for future studies to observe the long term shareholder 
value of an acquisition and differences if the deal involved a financial advisor or not. 
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Nevertheless, the positive effect on bidder return found in this study does not reflect the effect 
on long term shareholder growth. 
 
One of our hypotheses in this study was that financial advisors positively affect the bidder 
return. We hypothesized that the financial advisors contribute positively by reducing the 
asymmetric information. As stated in the skilled-advice hypothesis (Bao and Edmans, 2011), 
one would expect financial advisors to be an important part in the transaction, especially in a 
sector as the pharmaceutical. However, our results propose that no additional effect by hiring 
a financial advisor could be seen. In fact, the average CAR within the advisor sub-sample was 
insignificant positive, while the non-advisor sub-sample was significant positive on a 5% 
significance level. Even though the difference in means were insignificant, it raises questions 
about the efficiency of financial advisors in acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Additionally, these findings could support the rationales behind the phenomenon described in 
the article written in the Wall Street Journal (Mattioli, 2016, 10 May) regarding the increased 
number of acquisitions exercised in-house compared to advised acquisitions. This literature 
summarized might reveal a nature in the industry, where industry expertise is crucial and 
could be pronounced through the high number of in-house deals, as seen in our dataset (about 
50% of the total deals) or through alliances and sales experiences, as described by Higgins 
and Rodriquez (2006).  
 
As proposed in the passive execution hypothesis and shown in the study by Servaes and 
Zenner (1996) one would like to further investigate what financial advisors actually contribute 
with. Also, it is of great importance to understand what drives different studies in opposite 
directions regarding their contribution, in order to understand the value of M&A. One could 
hypothesize that as the asymmetric information increase, the passive execution hypothesis 
become more applicable. If financial advisors do not affect CAR positively, they might be 
passive executors, just following the instructions given by their clients. 
 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find that sales experience affect CAR positive. If this is 
correct, then it could explain why companies that perform the acquisition in-house and use 
their own experience from the industry would perform as good as or better than those that rely 
on external advisors. Also, by incorporating additional companies in adjacent sectors the 
pharmaceutical company can increase their sales experience and thereby their efficiency in 
acquisitions. This too would strengthen the uprising of the Big pharma industry. If the 
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companies themselves knows best what creates value one could hypothesize that companies 
does not only acquire in order to gain economies of scale or medical knowledge, but also 
knowledge needed for future acquisitions. The pharmaceutical industry is a wide and 
complicated industry with continuous research, in comparison to many other industries, one 
could only imagine the extensive knowledge needed by the financial advisor, to contribute to 
a lowering of the asymmetric information. A wider study whether or not there exist 
differences in the efficiency of financial advisors in different industries would be of great 
interest to further investigate this hypothesis. 
 
Golubov et al. (2012) suggests that top-tier financial advisors provide sufficient better advice 
than the average financial advisor in a public deal. Similar findings are also presented by 
Cressy et al (2007). Our study cannot confirm these results. We did not find any difference in 
bidder CAR between non-top-tier and top-tier banks. Further, one should remember that 
previous studies have examined the whole M&A market, while this study focused only on one 
industry. Yet, this result finds support in previous studies, such as Rau (2000), where they 
linked a higher market share for the advisors to a more negative acquirer return. Even though 
we did not found a negative return among top-tier banks, it still raises the questions about the 
efficiency of top-tier banks. 
 
The authors believe that there might exists an asymmetric information problem in the 
pharmaceutical industry that the average investment bank are unable to handle in an optimal 
way. However, in order to deepen the knowledge whether such issue exists, one would need 
to further investigate the relation between the pharmaceutical industry and financial advisors. 
Golubov et al. (2012) uses some more complex control variables that this study did not 
replicate. In order to gain more understanding regarding this topic studies including variables 
as this is recommended. 
 
Walter et al. (2008) writes about the difficulties of evaluating the true effect on industrial 
specialization in investment banks as it seems to be affected by choices of payment and 
reputation. Our results show a significant effect on CAR when using stocks in the deals where 
a financial advisor was hired. If Walter et al. (2008) is right about their hypothesis, this could 
be a bias in our result and explain the difference in effect on CAR when using stocks between 
the two sub-samples. 
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One could also discuss whether League tables and top-tier definition is the best way to 
measure industry specialization. Even though earlier studies used League tables, they have not 
been industrial specific studies and thereby not been focusing on industrial specialization as 
much as this study has. Is the total value or the number of prior acquisitions the most 
important factors or would a percentage of total deals in a specific industry be a better 
measurement? This study contributes to the existing literature by creating self-made, industry 
specific league tables with an aim to catch an industrial specialization among the financial 
advisors through a league table. In order to gain knowledge of financial advisors and 
industrial specialization, further research is needed to understand what makes an advised deal 
profitable and what makes a financial advisor industry specialized. 
 
One should have in mind that our models have restrictions to take in to considerations. The 
number of controls included in the model is less than found in similar studies. In comparison 
to Golubov et al. (2012), our R
2
 are lower in all regressions. Previous studies have included 
one or a few more complex controls, which seems to be a factor that make the R
2
 of their 
models higher. M&A and the stock market are complex and affected by numerous of factors, 
which makes it plausible that well developed control variables plays an important role in 
explaining the relationship between these phenomena.  
 
The scope instrument for the top-tier used in this model was based on the similar instrument 
developed by Golubov et al. (2012), although with some differences. However, the instrument 
did not show any significance in the probit model, in comparison to shown by Golubov et al. 
(2012). Therefore, one could question the validity of the instrument. In the study by Golubov 
et al. (2012) 39% of the advisors were top-tier advisors, while only 26% were top-tier in our 
study. If the number of deals performed by top-tier advisors decrease nowadays, it could 
lower the validity of the instrument and therefore explain the insignificance. However, when 
testing for weak instrument, it was rejected as weak, which propose that the instrument is 
valid. The insignificance viewed in our probit model could be due to a relative low number of 
top-tier observations, 47, which is much lower than Golubov et al. (2012).  
 
On the other hand, our Heckman two stage least squares confirms in many ways what our 
OLS-regressions show regarding our variable of interest, which propose that our results from 
those regressions are reliable. Also, our robustness analysis confirms these findings in our 
additional time windows. The findings in this study raise questions about the efficiency of 
 28 
financial advisors and encourage further research in differences in outcome from acquisitions 
between industries, performed with and without financial advisors. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study has examined three different hypotheses. First, if acquisitions create value in the 
pharmaceutical industry, second, if the choice of hiring a financial advisor matter for the 
value and last if the choice of financial advisor matter.   
 
The study was performed using the event-study methodology on a sample of 294 transactions 
between 2012-2016. The findings of this study suggest that acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
industry on average creates a positive abnormal return around the announcement date of 
3.03%. A difference in means could be noticed in cumulative abnormal return between the 
subgroups, with an advantage for the non-financial advisor group. However, no significant 
difference could be found. Further, no significant abnormal return could be assigned to deals 
including a financial advisor or the choice of employing a top-advisor.  
 
This results support our first hypothesis that M&A create shareholder value on short term 
basis. However, it does not support our second and third hypothesis that employing an advisor 
or top-tier advisor does positively affect the abnormal return. This contradicts the skilled-
advice hypothesis and embrace the passive execution hypothesis.  
 
Based on the results in this study one would suggest that acquisitions within the 
pharmaceutical industry is profitable when performing an in-house deal. However, in order to 
deepen the knowledge about what create a successful acquisition and to what extent a 
financial advisor contribute to it, further research is needed. As an example, future studies 
should deepen the knowledge in how to measure industrial specialization in the M&A 
industry, as a comparison to the commonly applied League Tables. 
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APPENDIX A 
League tables used to create dummy variable 
 
2011 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 35 523 651 
2 Morgan Stanley 32 897 162 
3 JP Morgan 29 332 046 
4 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) 
LLC 
27 244 000 
5 BNP Paribas SA 23 907 555 
6 Credit Suisse 21 354 528 
7 Deutsche Bank AG 20 712 981 
8 Evercore Partners Inc. 20 100 000 
9 SG Corporate & Investment Banking 20 100 000 
10 Bank of America Corporation 9 792 467 
 
 
2012 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 34 459 944 
2 Credit Suisse 32 069 886 
3 Morgan Stanley 24 782 700 
4 Bank of America Corporation 20 976 850 
5 Citigroup Inc. 12 430 252 
6 Barclays Capital plc 11 200 000 
7 Deutsche Bank AG 9 258 114 
8 Evercore Partners Inc. 7 000 000 
9 Blackstone Advisory Partners LP 5 846 850 
10 Lazard 4 084 684 
 
 
2013 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 JP Morgan 14 983 997 
2 Citigroup Inc. 12 017 201 
3 Bank of America Corporation 11 251 450 
4 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 11 122 019 
5 Morgan Stanley 10 970 426 
6 Deutsche Bank AG 9 037 156 
7 Glass Lewis & Company LLC 8 956 947 
8 Institutional Shareholder Services 8 912 450 
9 Egan-Jones Rating Company 8 529 521 
10 Greenhill & Company LLC 8 529 521 
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2014 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 JP Morgan 60 733 906 
2 Morgan Stanley 48 379 764 
3 Greenhill & Company LLC 24 244 506 
4 Bank of America Corporation 23 629 118 
5 Centerview Partners LLC 22 941 081 
6 Barclays plc 21 765 741 
7 Deutsche Bank AG 19 541 107 
8 Ernst & Young 17 134 717 
9 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 16 562 114 
10 Moelis & Company LLC 15 100 000 
 
2015 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 JP Morgan 186 783 334 
2 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 111 642 244 
3 Morgan Stanley 83 075 286 
4 Bank of America Corporation 78 155 727 
5 Centerview Partners LLC 73 267 577 
6 Lazard 53 358 439 
7 Citigroup Inc. 39 924 539 
8 Deutsche Bank AG 35 550 000 
9 Guggenheim Securities LLC 35 113 000 
10 Ernst & Young 23 321 550 
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APPENDIX B 
League tables used to create scope 
 
2007 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 42 523 373 
2 Merrill Lynch 35 797 607 
3 Morgan Stanley 21 334 583 
4 ABN Amro 17 636 844 
5 UBS 11 030 446 
6 Bear Stearns & Co Inc. 10 223 463 
7 Lazard 8 547 917 
8 JP Morgan 8 289 277 
9 Deutsche Bank AG 5 630 380 
10 Nomura Securities Co., Ltd 4 564 027 
 
2008 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 UBS 26 337 708 
2 Merrill Lynch 22 958 174 
3 Morgan Stanley 17 651 009 
4 JP Morgan 16 863 663 
5 Lehman Brothers 13 703 000 
6 Lazard 13 613 122 
7 Bank of America Corporation 13 345 000 
8 Deutsche Bank AG 13 286 519 
9 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 8 940 467 
10 Credit Suisse 5 718 840 
 
2009 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 161 163 928 
2 JP Morgan 117 871 625 
3 Morgan Stanley 113 365 554 
4 Bank of America Corporation 75 597 328 
5 Barclays Capital plc 75 140 000 
6 Evercore Partners Inc. 72 000 000 
7 Citigroup Inc. 71 847 769 
8 Barclays Bank plc 68 000 000 
9 Greenhill & Company LLC 46 800 000 
10 Credit Suisse 8 400 000 
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2010 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 Citigroup Inc. 34 925 105 
2 Credit Suisse 33 516 543 
3 Greenhill & Company LLC 28 627 000 
4 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 21 129 313 
5 Morgan Stanley 19 744 024 
6 Deutsche Bank AG 12 840 575 
7 Lazard 10 093 009 
8 Barclays Capital plc 7 986 822 
9 Guggenheim Partners LLC 7 200 000 
10 Perella Weinberg Partners LP 7 200 000 
 
2011 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 35 523 651 
2 Morgan Stanley 32 897 162 
3 JP Morgan 29 332 046 
4 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) 
LLC 
27 244 000 
5 BNP Paribas SA 23 907 555 
6 Credit Suisse 21 354 528 
7 Deutsche Bank AG 20 712 981 
8 Evercore Partners Inc. 20 100 000 
9 SG Corporate & Investment Banking 20 100 000 
10 Bank of America Corporation 9 792 467 
 
2012 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 34 459 944 
2 Credit Suisse 32 069 886 
3 Morgan Stanley 24 782 700 
4 Bank of America Corporation 20 976 850 
5 Citigroup Inc. 12 430 252 
6 Barclays Capital plc 11 200 000 
7 Deutsche Bank AG 9 258 114 
8 Evercore Partners Inc. 7 000 000 
9 Blackstone Advisory Partners LP 5 846 850 
10 Lazard 4 084 684 
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2013 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 JP Morgan 14 983 997 
2 Citigroup Inc. 12 017 201 
3 Bank of America Corporation 11 251 450 
4 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 11 122 019 
5 Morgan Stanley 10 970 426 
6 Deutsche Bank AG 9 037 156 
7 Glass Lewis & Company LLC 8 956 947 
8 Institutional Shareholder Services 8 912 450 
9 Egan-Jones Rating Company 8 529 521 
10 Greenhill & Company LLC 8 529 521 
 
2014 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 JP Morgan 60 733 906 
2 Morgan Stanley 48 379 764 
3 Greenhill & Company LLC 24 244 506 
4 Bank of America Corporation 23 629 118 
5 Centerview Partners LLC 22 941 081 
6 Barclays plc 21 765 741 
7 Deutsche Bank AG 19 541 107 
8 Ernst & Young 17 134 717 
9 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 16 562 114 
10 Moelis & Company LLC 15 100 000 
 
2015 
 Financial Advisor Total deal value     
th USD 
1 JP Morgan 186 783 334 
2 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 111 642 244 
3 Morgan Stanley 83 075 286 
4 Bank of America Corporation 78 155 727 
5 Centerview Partners LLC 73 267 577 
6 Lazard 53 358 439 
7 Citigroup Inc. 39 924 539 
8 Deutsche Bank AG 35 550 000 
9 Guggenheim Securities LLC 35 113 000 
10 Ernst & Young 23 321 550 
 
